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Abstract
This paper offers a new approach to the study of capitalist income. Building
on the ‘capital as power’ framework, I propose that capitalists earn their income
not from any productive asset, but from the legal right to command a corporate
hierarchy. In short, I hypothesize that capitalist income stems from hierarchical
power. Based on this thinking, I hypothesize that the capitalist fraction of an
individual’s income is a gradient function of hierarchical power (which I define
as the number of subordinates under one’s control). Using data from US CEOs,
I find evidence that this is true. Furthermore, a hierarchical model of the United
States that generalizes this data accurately reproduces many aspects of the US
distribution of capitalist income, including the relation between income size and
capitalist income fraction. This evidence suggests that the ownership structure
of US society is closely linked to the hierarchical structure of firms. This has
important implications for the study of income distribution.
JEL Subject Codes: D31 (Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions); D33 (Fac-
tor Income Distribution); B5 (Current Heterodox Approaches);
Keywords: capitalist income; hierarchy; power; functional income distribution; per-
sonal income distribution; inequality; capital as power
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1 Introduction
What is the source of capitalist income? There is perhaps no question in political
economy that is more contested. While there is a consensus among political
economists that capitalists earn income because they own capital, this merely
begs the question — what is capital? And why do capitalists earn income from
owning it?
Ideas about the source of capitalist income inform the major divisions in po-
litical economic theory. According to neoclassical theory, capitalists earn income
because their capital is inherently productive. Marxist theory, on the other hand,
proposes that capitalists earn income by exploiting workers. But, as Nitzan and
Bichler (2009) observe, both approaches have a fundamental problem — they
posit theories of value based on unobservable units. Neoclassical theory claims
that value stems from utility, while Marxist theory claims that value stems from
labor, as measured by socially necessary abstract labor time. But, neither utility
nor socially necessary abstract labor time can be observed (even in principle).
Given this fundamental problem, Nitzan and Bichler take the radical step of
proposing an entirely new approach to political economy that they call capital as
power. As the name implies, Nitzan and Bichler hypothesize that capital should
be treated not as a physical thing, but as a “symbolic quantification of power”.
The ‘capital as power’ framework has opened the door to many new forms of
empirical analysis (for a sample, see Baines, 2014a,b; Cochrane, 2015; Di Muzio,
2015, 2017; Hager, 2013, 2016; McMahon, 2013, 2018; Park, 2016). This paper
builds on the ‘capital as power’ approach to explore the relation between firm
hierarchy and capitalist income.
Put succinctly, I propose that capitalist income is derived from hierarchical
power (which I define as the number of subordinates under an individual’s con-
trol). By owning firms, capitalists earn the legal right to command firm hierar-
chies. From this position of power, capitalists can partition firm income streams
as they see fit (Fix, 2015). But a hierarchy does not have a single position of
power. Rather, there is a gradient of power from top to bottom. Perhaps, along
with this gradient of power, there is a gradient of ownership and a gradient of
capitalist income? I call this the ‘capitalist gradient’ hypothesis. The idea is that
the proportion of income individuals earn from capitalist sources tends to in-
crease with hierarchical power. In other words, we can predict (in statistical
terms) someone’s capitalist income fraction simply by knowing their position
within a firm hierarchy.
This is a bold and very much exploratory idea, but one worth testing. Sur-
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prisingly (from amainstream perspective), the capitalist gradient hypothesis has
empirical support. First, I find that the capitalist income fraction of US CEOs
scales with hierarchical power. Second, I use a hierarchical model of the United
States economy (developed in Fix, 2018a) to test if this CEO relation can be
generalized to the whole US population. The model suggests that it does. This
capitalist gradient model reproduces the US distribution of capitalist income as
well as the scaling relation between income size and capitalist income fraction.
While these results are contingent on the limited data that is available, they
suggest that a systemic relation exists between hierarchical power and both func-
tional and personal income. Put simply, hierarchical elites, top earners, and
capitalists are all the same people. This has important theoretical and empirical
implications for the study of income distribution. On the theoretical front, it
supports the idea that capitalist income stems from hierarchical power. On the
empirical front, it opens new avenues for understanding the relation between
income inequality and the class-based distribution of income.
This paper is laid out as follows. In section 2, I briefly review the major the-
ories of capitalist income and discuss their shortcomings. In section 3, I outline
my ‘capitalist gradient’ hypothesis, which proposes that capitalist income is a
function of hierarchical power. In section 4, I test this hypothesis using data on
CEO pay in the United States. In section 5, I use a hierarchical model of the
United States to test if the CEO findings generalize to the US population as a
whole. Lastly, in sections 6 and 7, I discuss the significance of these results and
outline avenues for future research.
2 Theories of Capitalist Income
I review here three theories of capitalist income: neoclassical, Marxist, and cap-
ital as power. The first two are the great pillars of political economic theory that
have dominated 20th century thinking. Capital as power, on the other hand,
has been developed only recently and is not widely known. My aim is to review
the basic tenets of neoclassical and Marxist theory, and outline the problems
that Nitzan and Bichler attempt to solve (or avoid) with their ‘capital as power’
approach.
Neoclassical Theory
Let’s begin with the neoclassical vision of capital. In neoclassical theory, capital
is a ‘factor of production’. Capital consists of all the tools, technology, and in-
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Figure 1: The Neoclassical Vision of Capitalist Income
In neoclassical theory, capitalists earn income because their capital is inherently produc-
tive. Capitalists earn the ‘marginal product’ of their capital — the incremental increase
in output per incremental increase in capital input.
frastructure that are used to produce economic output. Capitalists earn income
because their capital is productive — it contributes to economic output. This
thinking was formalized by Clark (1899) and Wicksteed (1894) in the form of
marginal productivity theory. In this theory, capitalists earn the marginal prod-
uct of their capital— the incremental increase in output per incremental increase
in capital input.
The neoclassical vision of capitalist income is illustrated in Figure 1, where
capital is shown as machinery. Admittedly, neoclassical economists have signifi-
cantly broadened their definition of ‘capital’ over the years. For instance, there
is now ‘human capital’ (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1961), ‘knowledge
capital’ (Carr et al., 2001; Loof and Heshmati, 2002), and even ‘cultural capital’
(Throsby, 1999). However, what has not changed is the insistence that ‘capital’
(in all its forms) is inherently productive.
While neoclassical marginal productivity has a seductive simplicity, it is be-
set by insurmountable measurement problems. First, to measure the marginal
product of capital, we must be able to isolate changes in output that are due to
changes in capital alone (and not due to changes in labor, or anything else). In
practice, this is virtually impossible to do (Pullen, 2009). Furthermore, to mea-
sure the incremental change in capital input, we must be able to unambiguously
measure the size of the capital stock itself. But as the Cambridge capital contro-
versy demonstrated, there is no way to measure the quantity of capital indepen-
dently of prices and income distribution (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003; Felipe and
Fisher, 2003; Harcourt, 2015; Hodgson, 2005). This makes the measurement of
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Figure 2: The Marxist Vision of Capitalist Income
In Marxist theory, capitalists earn income because they own the ‘means of production’.
Unlike neoclassical theory, Marxists see labor as the source of all value, and capitalists
as parasites. Because capitalists control the means of production (capital), they are able
to extract a surplus from labor.
capital circularly dependent on the very thing we are trying to explain — the in-
come of capitalists. Furthermore, prices change all the time, which means that
the quantity of capital must be tied to something more fundamental. In neo-
classical theory, this elementary particle is the ‘utility’ created by capital. The
problem, as Nitzan and Bichler (2009) note, is that utility is unobservable (see
also Hodgson, 2012). As a result, the neoclassical theory of capitalist income is
untestable.
Marxist Theory
Like neoclassical theory, Marxists start with a physical understanding of capital.
According to Marx (1867), capital is the ‘means of production’ — the tools, tech-
nology, and infrastructure that are used by society to create economic output.
But unlike the neoclassical vision of harmony between workers and capitalists,
the Marxist twist is to assert that capitalist income is parasitic. Marxists believe
that labor is the source of all value. Capitalists earn income because they own
the means of production, and are able to extract a surplus from labor. This
thinking is illustrated in Figure 2.
The task for Marxists is to measure the surplus value created by labor, and
to show that this is equal to the profit earned by capitalists. Nitzan and Bichler
identify three basic problems with this approach. First, Marxist theory requires a
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consistent unit of human labor that allows qualitatively different workers (such
as doctors and farmers) to be compared. Marx proposed ‘socially necessary ab-
stract labor’ as his basic unit. Unfortunately, like the neoclassical notion of util-
ity, this unit is unobservable. Second, Marx differentiated between ‘productive’
and ‘unproductive’ labor, with only productive labor creating value. But how
are we to differentiate between the two? Nitzan and Bichler argue that there
is no way to do so. Lastly, there is the problem of transforming labor time into
prices. Again, we run into insurmountable difficulties. In his exhaustive review
of the topic, Paul Samuelson (1971) notes that the two accounting systems of
labor time and price are mutually exclusive and cannot be equated to one an-
other. Like neoclassical theory, these problems mean that the Marxist vision of
capitalist income is untestable.
Capital as Power
Both neoclassical and Marxist theories of capital keep their eyes firmly on the
‘real’ sphere of production — on the ownership of things. This means that both
approaches must show how the ‘real’ sphere of production accounts for the ‘nom-
inal’ sphere of prices. But this gives rise to all of the problems discussed above.
In the ‘capital as power’ approach, Nitzan and Bichler attempt to avoid this prob-
lem by focusing on the act of ownership itself, and not on what is owned. Nitzan
and Bichler summarize: “ownership is wholly and only an institution of exclu-
sion, and institutional exclusion is a matter of organized power”. According to
the ‘capital as power’ hypothesis, capital is not a thing, but an act. It is a com-
modification of property rights — a vendible form of power.
Intellectual property represents the simplest form of this exclusionary power.
By purchasing a patent, the owner gains the legal right to exclude all others from
making use of the patented idea. Because of this legal monopoly, the owner has
the power to set prices. For instance, in 2014 the US company Retrophin pur-
chased the rights to market Thiola, a drug used to treat the rare disease cystin-
uria. Promptly thereafter, Retrophin raised the price by a factor of 20 — because
they could (Lowe, 2014). Furthermore, the owner of intellectual property need
not produce anything or provide any service to earn income. As the practice of
‘patent trolling’ attests, the owner of a patent may simply enforce his right of ex-
clusion by using the legal system to extract ‘damages’ from non-compliant firms.
It is clear, in this case, that the patent owner’s income derives from institution-
alized exclusionary power, and not from any productive asset. This focus on the
institutional act of ownership is, in my view, the key strength of the ‘capital as
power’ approach.
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3 Capitalist Income and Hierarchy: A Gradient Hypothesis
Like Nitzan and Bichler, I begin my inquiry into capitalist income by reflecting
on the act of ownership. Consider what it means to purchase all the shares in a
company. What is it that you are buying? True, you are buying whatever assets
(tangible or intangible) the company owns. But these change with time. I argue
that what you are really purchasing is legal control over the company. From this
position of power, you have legal authority to divide up the firm’s income stream
as you see fit. You could slash wages and pay yourself a magnificent profit, or
raise wages and earn no profit at all. From this perspective, capitalist income
stems from one’s power as owner.
For the present argument regarding the basis of capitalist income, I set aside
the question of how the firm’s income stream is derived. Instead, I am inter-
ested in how an owner wields power to partition a firm’s income stream. The
central hypothesis in this paper is that firms are hierarchically organized.1 This
hypothesis implies that ownership confers the right to sit at the top of the firm
hierarchy. From this position of hierarchical power (as owner), the capitalist has
the authority to divide up the firm’s income stream. This suggests that capitalist
income stems from hierarchical power, as illustrated in Figure 3.
While intuitive, this vision of capitalists sitting at the tops of corporate hi-
erarchies is almost certainly too simplistic. The problem is that it is based on a
19th century, all-or-nothing concept of ownership. In Figure 3, there is only one
owner of the firm. Unfortunately, the rise of joint-stock companies muddies this
tidy theory. Joint-stock companies allow ownership to by divided among many
people. In the modern world, the dominance of public corporations means that
partial ownership is the rule, not the exception. This realization led to the fa-
mous ‘separation thesis’ posited by Berle and Means (1932). The idea is that
ownership has become so diffuse that capitalists no longer control the corporate
hierarchy. Instead, control is ceded to managers, who are employees.
The problem with the separation thesis is that it acknowledges the rise of
1Based purely on worldly experience, most people would agree that firms are hierarchically
organized. Surprisingly, this structure has not been widely studied. However the handful of
studies that do exist confirm our basic intuition. Firms tend to have a pyramid employment
structure and an inverse pyramid pay structure. For case studies, see Audas et al. (2004); Baker
et al. (1993); Dohmen et al. (2004); Grund (2005); Lima (2000); Morais and Kakabadse (2014);
Treble et al. (2001). For aggregate studies, see Ariga et al. (1992); Bell and Van Reenen (2012);
Eriksson (1999); Heyman (2005); Leonard (1990); Main et al. (1993); Mueller et al. (2016);
Rajan and Wulf (2006); Tao and Chen (2009). For a meta analysis of these studies, see Fix
(2018b).
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Figure 3: A Hierarchical Power Vision of Capitalist Income
This figure shows my interpretation of the ‘capital as power’ framework, when applied
to a hierarchically organized firm. Unlike in neoclassical and Marxist visions of capital
(Fig. 1 and 2, respectively) I do not show physical capital. This is not to say that physical
capital does not exist — we simply do not focus on it. Rather, we focus on ownership
of institutions. Capital is conceived solely in terms of property rights. By purchasing a
firm, a capitalist purchases the legal right to sit at the top of the firm hierarchy. From
this position of power, the capitalist has the right to divide up the firm’s income stream
as he sees fit. Under this vision, hierarchical power is the source of capitalist income.
partial ownership, but insists on a traditional dichotomy between capitalists and
laborers. The truth is that the line between being a capitalist and being a laborer
has been blurred. Top managers often earn a large portion of their income from
stock options. Conversely, owners of firms often pay themselves some form of
salary. Instead of a capitalist-laborer dichotomy, what we need is a capitalist-
laborer gradient. This implies that there is a steady range between being purely
a capitalist and being purely a laborer. Figure 4 shows what this might look like
when applied to a hierarchy. As one moves up the hierarchy, individuals become
increasingly more capitalistic.
This capitalist gradient hypothesis can be interpreted a number of ways. The
simplest interpretation is to assume a gradient of ownership within a single firm.
However, this is realistic only for firms that are 100% employee owned. While
such firms do exist (and can become quite large), they are not the norm. It is
more common for a firm to have partial employee ownership via an employee
stock ownership plan. In 2017, about 14 million Americans were enrolled in
employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) (NCEO, 2017). This represents about
9% of the workforce. It is quite plausible that these employee stock options are
preferentially rewarded to the top tiers of the hierarchy. However, ESOP assets
constitute a small minority (roughly 4%) of total US market capitalization.2 This
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Figure 4: A Gradient Vision of Capitalist Income
This figure shows a more nuanced (than Fig. 3) interpretation of the relation between
capitalist income and firm hierarchy. In this model, there is a smooth gradient between
being 100% capitalist (earning all your income from capitalist sources) and being 100%
laborer (earning all your income from labor sources). I hypothesize that the capitalist
share of individual income tends to increase with hierarchical power.
means they are probably not the main source of capitalist income.
Therefore, it is most realistic to interpret the gradient model as a statisti-
cal phenomenon that occurs at the societal level. We admit that the ownership
structure of any given firm is likely complex. Similarly, we admit that individ-
uals who earn capitalist income may receive it from a variety of firms. But at
the aggregate level, we hypothesize that earning capitalist income is related to
hierarchical class structure. This is the hypothesis that I test.
Measuring Hierarchical Power
To test the capitalist gradient hypothesis, we need tomeasure hierarchical power.
What is hierarchical power? I define it as the ability to control subordinates
within a hierarchical chain of command Fix (2018b). Unlike the more general
concept of ‘social power’, hierarchical power is easier to pin down and quantify.
This is because the chain of command structure of a hierarchy clearly delineates
who has control over whom. A hierarchy is nothing but a nested set of power
relations between superior and subordinates (ruler and ruled). It is a control
structure that concentrates power at the top (Mones et al., 2012).
2 In 2017, ESOPs had total assets of roughly $1.3 trillion (NCEO, 2017), while total USmarket
capitalization was roughly $30 trillion, according to the Russel 3000 index.
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I propose that one’s power within a social hierarchy is proportional to the
number of subordinates under one’s control. I put this in formula form as:
hierarchical power= number of subordinates+ 1 (1)
The logic of this equation is that all individuals start at a baseline power of 1,
indicating that they have control over themselves. Power then increases linearly
with the number of subordinates.
Figure 5: Measuring Hierarchical Power
As an example, suppose we want to find the hierarchical power of the red
individual in Figure 5. This person has two direct subordinates, each of whom
have 2 subordinates. Thus the red individual has control over 6 subordinates
in total, mean his/her hierarchical power is 7. The general form of a branching
hierarchy means that hierarchical power increases exponentially with rank.
4 Testing the Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis Using CEO Pay
If the capitalist gradient hypothesis is correct, we should be able to find evidence
that capitalist income fraction increases with hierarchical power. I test the capi-
talist gradient hypothesis using US CEO income data. This data is convenient for
two reasons. First, CEO income data is easy to obtain. US regulation requires
that public companies disclose CEO compensation. Second, we can estimate a
CEO’s hierarchical power without any knowledge of the firm’s hierarchical struc-
ture. Under the assumption that the CEO holds the top hierarchical position in
a firm, it follows that their hierarchical power is equivalent to the number of
employees in the firm.
This thinking is visualized in Figure 6. If a firm has x employees, x   1 of
them will be subordinate to the CEO. Since hierarchical power is defined as the
number of subordinates plus one, the CEO’s hierarchical power is simply firm
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Figure 6: CEO Hierarchical Power
This figure shows the relation between firm size and CEO hierarchical power. Each
hierarchy represents a different firm, with the CEO at the top (red). If hierarchical
power is defined as the number of subordinates + 1 (Eq. 1), CEOs have hierarchical
power equal to firm size.
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Figure 7: Capitalist Income Fraction of US CEOs
This figure plots the relation between capitalist income fraction and firm size for roughly
40,000 American CEOs over the years 1992-2015. Assuming that CEOs sit at the top of
the corporate hierarchy, firm size is a direct indicator of CEO hierarchical power. The
median (P50) and interquartile range (P25-P50) for capitalist income fraction are cal-
culated using logarithmically spaced firm-size bins. The dashed line indicates the linear
regression used for modeling purposes. Data comes from Execucomp and Compustat.
For sources and methods, see the Appendix.
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size x . Thus, if we have data for firm size, we automatically have data for CEO
hierarchical power.
So how do we calculate the ‘capitalist’ component of CEO income? I define
the CEO capitalist income fraction as the portion of total income received from
stock options:
CEO Capitalist Income Fraction=
Income from Stock Options
Total Compensation
(2)
Unlike cash compensation, there are many different ways to value stock options
(Carr and Madan, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Jarrow and Rudd, 1982). This
means that CEO capitalist income fraction has some inherent ambiguity. How-
ever, the nuances of stock option valuation do not concern me here. Instead, I
am interested in general trends in CEO compensation. For this task, the standard
methods for stock option valuation will do just fine. I use CEO income data
from the Execucomp database. The data series and their underlying methods
are discussed in the Appendix.
Figure 7 shows the resulting relation between capitalist income fraction and
firm size for roughly 40,000 American CEOs over the years 1992-2015. Two
important findings emerge. Firstly, the capitalist fraction of CEO income tends
to increase with firm size (and hence hierarchical power). Secondly, capitalist
income fraction tends towards zero for CEOs in very small firms (fewer than 10
employees). These results are consistent with the capitalist gradient hypothesis.
They support the idea that earning capitalist income is a gradient function of
hierarchical power.
5 Testing the Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis Using a Hierarchy
Model of the United States
The evidence from US CEOs begs a question: does the relation between CEO
capitalist income fraction and hierarchical power generalize to the broader US
population? While data constraints stop us from answering this question di-
rectly (which is why we turned to CEO data in the first place), we can answer it
indirectly by using a hierarchy model of the United States.
The US Hierarchy Model
In Fix (2018a), I develop and test a large-scale model that simulates the hierar-
chical structure of the US economy. The model is essentially an extrapolation. It
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Figure 8: A Landscape View of the US Hierarchy Model
This figure visualizes the US hierarchy model as a landscape of three dimensional firms.
Each pyramid represents a single firm, with size indicating the number of employees
and height corresponding to the number of hierarchical levels. If you look closely, you
will see vertical lines corresponding to individuals. Income (relative to the median) is
indicated by color. This visualization has 20,000 firms — a small sample of the actual
model, which uses 1 million firms.
takes the available case-study data on firm hierarchy and fits trends to it. Using
these trends, as well as data for a large sample of US firms from the Compu-
stat database, the model extrapolates to simulate the hierarchical employment
and pay structure of the US private sector. The model produces results that are
consistent with the US distribution of income, especially the tail.
I do not review the technical details of the model here (see Fix, 2018a).
However, to give an intuitive understanding of what the hierarchy model ‘looks’
like, Figure 8 shows a landscape view of the model’s structure. Each pyramid
represents a different hierarchically-organized firm. The size of each pyramid
corresponds to the number of employees, height represents hierarchical level,
and color represents relative income.
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Modeling Capitalist Income
The US hierarchy model can be used to indirectly test if the CEO capitalist in-
come trends in Figure 7 generalize to the US population as a whole. I do this by
using the CEO data to create a simple function relating capitalist income frac-
tion to hierarchical power. Once I have this function, I plug it into the hierarchy
model and endow each individual with a capitalist income. I then check the
model’s results against US data. If the model produces results that are way off
the mark, we know that the CEO results do not generalize to the whole popula-
tion. However, if the model produces results that are consistent with US data,
this is indirect evidence that capitalist income fraction increases with hierarchical
power in the wider US population.
The first step is to idealize the Figure 7 trend between CEO capitalist in-
come fraction and hierarchical power. The simplest interpretation of this trend
is that CEO income fraction increases linearly with the logarithm of hierarchical
power. I fit the CEO data with a one-parameter logarithmic function, resulting
in the ‘Modeled Trend’ line shown in Figure 7. This gives the following function
relating capitalist income fraction (Kfrac) to hierarchical power (P):3
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) (3)
This function is naive in the sense that it implies a deterministic relation
between hierarchical power and capitalist income fraction — something that
certainly does not exist in the real world. However, models are always sim-
plifications, and it is often useful to simplify a noisy (stochastic) trend with a
deterministic one. If the results are good, we can add more realism later. If the
results are bad we throw away the model.
The next step is to plug this equation into the hierarchy model. We calculate
the hierarchical power of each individual in the model (see the Appendix) and
then use Eq. 3 to calculate the capitalist fraction of their income. The resulting
US capitalist gradient model is visualized in landscape form in Figure 9. As
expected, capitalist income fraction is tightly related to hierarchical rank.
If the CEO capitalist income trend is generalizable, the capitalist gradient
3 The discerning reader may note that, since a logarithmic function is uniformly increasing,
Eq. 3 permits capitalist income fraction greater than 1. In practice, such results do not occur
because the model does not permit firm sizes greater than 2.3 million — the largest US firm that
has ever existed (Walmart, circa 2015). For this maximum hierarchical power of 2.3 million, Eq.
3 yields a capitalist income fraction of about 0.7.
Testing the Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis Using a Hierarchy Model of the
United States 15
Figure 9: A Landscape View of the US Capitalist Gradient Model
This figure visualizes the US capitalist gradient model as a landscape of firms. Each
pyramid represents a firm, with size indicating the number of employees. Hierarchical
rank is indicated by height, and capitalist income fraction by color.
model should produces results that match US data. So does it? Figure 10 com-
pares the model to the United States.
Let’s begin with the relation between capitalist income fraction and individ-
uals’ total income size (Fig. 10A). Here I plot Thomas Piketty’s (2014) data
showing how US capitalist income fraction increases with income percentile.
As illustrated by the inset plot (which uses a linear x-axis scale), there is an
explosion of capitalist income that occurs in the topmost income percentiles. Ev-
idently, those who earn very large incomes are overwhelmingly capitalists (and
vice versa). The main panel spreads out this explosion by using an inverted log-
arithmic x-axis scale. Two different US trend-lines are shown. The upper line
includes capital gains in the calculation of capitalist income, while the lower line
does not. (The step-wise nature of these curves reflects Piketty’s income bins.)
Like the US data, the capitalist gradient model predicts an explosion in capitalist
income amongst top earners.
Moving on, Figure 10B shows the size distribution of US capitalist income.
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Figure 10: Comparing the Capitalist Gradient Model to US Data
This figure compares the income distribution generated by the capitalist gradient model
to US data. Panel A shows how capitalist income fraction increases with income per-
centile (ranked by total income). The inset plot uses a linear x-axis scale, while the
main plot uses an inverted logarithmic scale of top incomes. Note that US empirical
data has ‘steps’ that correspond to the bins in the source data. The blue line and shaded
regions indicate the model’s median and 95% range, respectively. For Panels B, C and D,
US capitalist income is defined as the sum of income from dividends and interest. Data
covers the years 1990 - 2014. Panel B shows the size distribution of capitalist income.
The model data is normalized to have mean income in the same range as the US data.
Panel C shows the inequality of capitalist income, as measured by the Gini index, while
Panel D shows capitalist income inequality as measured by the income share of the top
1%. Panel E shows the capitalist share of total (national) income. For comparison, I
also show the dividend and net interest share of US income. For sources and methods,
see the Appendix.
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For this graph (as well as Fig. 10C, D and E ), I define capitalist income as
the sum of income from dividends and interest. Although many people do earn
some capitalist income (i.e. from interest on savings), the amount is usually
inconsequentially small. This fact is reflected in the inset panel, which plots the
capitalist income distribution on a linear scale. Nearly all reported capitalist
incomes are lower than $5000. In order to see the tail of the distribution, the
main plot uses a log-log scale. Again, the model is consistent with US data. To
get these results, I do nothing but index the model data so it has the same mean
as US data. Without tuning it to do so, the model effectively reproduces the tail
of US capitalist income distribution.
How about capitalist income inequality? Figure 10C and D show the Gini
index and top 1% share of capitalist income, respectively. Just to be clear, the
latter metric captures the share of total capitalist income held by the top 1%
of reported capitalist incomes. First off, note how unequal US capitalist income
is. The Gini index hovers around 0.9 (the maximum is 1), while the top 1% of
capitalists earn about 40% of total capitalist income. The model reproduces this
staggering income share of the top 1%, but falls short with the Gini index. Why?
Part of the problem can be seen in Figure 10B — the model produces slightly
too many capitalist incomes between $2000 to $5000.
However, the primary problem has to do with the function used to determine
capitalist income (Eq. 3). Capitalist income is assumed to increase linearly with
the logarithm of hierarchical power. Since log(1) = 0, all individuals with a hier-
archical power of 1 (the lowest amount possible) will have exactly zero capitalist
income. When calculating inequality, these null incomes are (by convention) ex-
cluded. If we adjust the model slightly so that instead of having no income, these
individuals have a tiny capitalist income, we get Gini index results that match
US data. See Appendix B for more details of this adjustment.
Lastly, Figure 10E shows the capitalist share of total (national) income. The
model produces a capitalist income share that is slightly lower than (but in a
similar range as) the US data (from 1992-2014).
To summarize, the US capitalist gradient model takes trends between capi-
talist income and hierarchical power found in CEO pay, and generalizes them to
the US population as a whole. The resulting model produces results that closely
match US empirical data. This is indirect evidence suggesting that capitalist
income fraction scales with hierarchical power in the general US population.
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6 Discussion
The results shown in Figure 7 and 10 are preliminary, and should be treated
with appropriate uncertainty. That being said, I want to reflect on their poten-
tial significance. In effect, the capitalist gradient model connects three things.
It suggests that hierarchical class structure, ownership class structure, and per-
sonal income distribution are all related. Put another way, hierarchical elites,
capitalists, and top earners are all the same people.
What are we to make of this hypothesized relation between authority, prop-
erty rights, and income? One interpretation is that it is nothing new. Suppose,
when speaking about a feudal society, I stated that hierarchical elites, aristocrats,
and the very rich are all the same people. This would be nothing particularly
controversial. We are quite comfortable concluding that historical societies had
a ruling class (Mosca, 1939). But many would bristle at that thought in our
own society. Yet consider Reinhard Bendix’s description of the relation between
authority, property rights, and income in German feudal society. He writes:
... governmental functions were usable rights which could be sold or leased at
will. For example, judicial authority was a type of property. The person who
bought or leased that property was entitled to adjudicate disputes and receive
the fees and penalties incident to such adjudication. (Bendix, 1980, p. 149)
If we paraphrase Bendix, we arrive at the same reasoning that I used to derive
the capitalist gradient hypothesis. Building on the work of Nitzan and Bichler,
I suggested that ‘capitalist authority’ is a ‘type of property’. The person who
buys this property is ‘entitled’ to wield hierarchical power and ‘receive income’
in return. From this reasoning came the hypothesis that capitalist income should
be related to hierarchical rank and power.
From the perspective of mainstream economic theory, this hypothesis is quite
radical. It undermines the ubiquitous assumption that capitalists earn income
from a productive asset. But given Bendix’s comments on feudal society, the
capitalist gradient hypothesis may be quite conservative. Why? Conservatism
implies a lack of change—amaintenance of the same order. The capitalist gradi-
ent hypothesis may be conservative because it suggests that income distribution
in modern capitalist societies might not be as different from past feudal societies
as we would like to think.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has outlined a new approach to the study of capitalist income that
focuses on firm hierarchy. Drawing on the capital as power framework (Nitzan
and Bichler, 2009), I have sought to understand capitalist income in terms of
the institutional act of ownership. When a capitalist purchases a firm, I have
argued that they purchase the right to rule a corporate hierarchy. From this
position of hierarchical power, the capitalist has the legal right to partition the
firm’s income stream as they see fit. In this approach, capitalist income stems
from hierarchical power.
Because of the rise of partial ownership, which has led to the blurring of
the distinction between capitalists and laborers, I have proposed that capitalist
income is a gradient function of hierarchical power. The idea is that individuals
with more hierarchical power will tend to (on average) derive a greater portion
of their income from capitalist sources. Evidence fromUS CEO data supports this
hypothesis. Furthermore, a hierarchy model of the US that generalizes this CEO
relation accurately reproduces many aspects of the US distribution of capitalist
income. This includes the scaling of capitalist income fraction with income size.
Together, this evidence suggests a connection between hierarchical status,
ownership and income, at least in the United States. In a long-term histori-
cal context, this connection is not particularly surprising. It is exactly what we
would expect to find when investigating a feudal aristocracy. However, it runs
counter to the prevailing doctrines in mainstream economic theory that deny
the existence of concentrated power (Peach, 1987).
Of course, more research is needed to understand the generality of the re-
sults presented here. For instance, do they hold in other countries and during
different time periods? Because of the importance of replication (and further
analysis), I have made available all raw data and code used in this paper.
To conclude, the last century of political economy has been marked by a
prolonged ideological struggle between neoclassical and Marxist thought. Neo-
classical theory paints a picture of harmony in which capitalists and laborers
are each paid their fair share. In contrast, Marxist theory paints a picture of
conflict, in which capitalists derive their income by exploiting workers. Unfor-
tunately, both theories are mired by deep epistemological problems that make
them untestable.
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The solution, Nitzan and Bichler have argued, is to focus on the institutional
act of ownership (and not on the things that are owned). I have taken Nitzan and
Bichler’s work, and added to it the study of firm hierarchy. While this approach
certainly does not hold all the answers, the evidence presented here suggests
that it is a fruitful way to study capitalist income.
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Appendix
Supplementary materials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work:
https://osf.io/rn3uc/
The supplementary materials include:
1. Raw source data;
2. R code for all analysis;
3. Hierarchy model code.
A Sources and Methods
Fig. 7: Capitalist Income Fraction of US CEOs
I define the capitalist income share of executives (Kfrac) as the ratio of stock-
options income to total income:
Kfrac =
Stock Options
Total Income
(4)
Executive compensation data comes from the Execucomp database. Execu-
comp contains two main accounting methods for valuing stock options: a ‘1992’
reporting format that applies from 1992 to 2005’, and a ‘2006’ reporting for-
mat that applies from 2006 onward. These series are summarized in Table 1.
For both reporting formats, the relevant total income series (TDC1) remains the
same. I calculate the capitalist income fraction of executives using the following
two formulas for 1992 format and 2006 format, respectively:
Kfrac_1992 =
RSTKGRNT+OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE
TDC1
(5)
Kfrac_2006 =
STOCK_AWARDS_FV+OPTION_AWARDS_FV
TDC1
(6)
Firm employment data is from Compustat series EMP.
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Table 1: Data Used to Calculate Executive Capitalist Income Fraction
Series Description
Reporting
Format
RSTKGRNT
The value of restricted stock granted during the year
(determined as of the date of the grant).
1992
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE
The aggregate value of stock options granted to the
executive during the year as valued using Standard &
Poor’s Black-Scholes methodology.
1992
TDC1
Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted
Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted
(using BlackScholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and
All Other
1992
STOCK_AWARDS_FV
Fair value of all stock awards during the year as detailed
in the Plan Based Awards table. Valuation is based upon
the grant-date fair value as detailed in FAS 123R.
2006
OPTION_AWARDS_FV
Fair value of all options awarded during the year as
detailed in the Plan Based Awards table. Valuation is
based upon the grant-date fair value as detailed in FAS
123R.
2006
TDC1
Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity Incentive Plan
Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards,
Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards, Deferred
Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation,
and Other Compensation.
2006
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Fig. 10: Comparing the Capitalist Gradient Model to US Data
Capitalist Income Fraction vs. Income Percentile
US data is for the year 2007 and comes from Piketty (2014), Fig. 8.10. Data is
available at piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2.
Capitalist Income Gini Index, Top 1% Share, and Size Distribution
Data for US capitalist income Gini index, top 1% share, and size distribution all
come from the IPUMS database. I define capitalist income as the sum of income
from dividends and interest. (Dividends = series INCDIVID, Interest = series
INCINT).
Themain challengewith this dataset is that it censors income above $100,000.
All incomes above this threshold are replaced with a ‘topcode’ value. To deal
with this censoring, I use the method proposed by Jenkins et al. (2011). The
gist of this method is that you fit the uncensored data with a parametric distri-
bution. You then replace the censored (topcoded) data with stochastic values
drawn from the fitted parametric distribution (above the censor threshold). This
gives a partially synthetic dataset on which you compute whatever statistic you
desire. Because the process is stochastic, you repeat it many times, giving a
range of values for the given statistic.
I follow Jenkins et al. by using the GB2 distribution (generalized beta dis-
tribution of the second kind) to fit uncensored data. I use the R GB2 package
(Graf and Nedyalkova, 2012) to fit both the dividends and interest data with
a GB2 distribution. After replacing topcoded values with synthetic data, I sum
dividends and interest income to estimate capitalist income. Figure 11 shows
the resulting estimates for the Gini index and top 1% share of capitalist income.
Although there is uncertainty in each annual estimate, the actual range of in-
equality values is dominated by the secular trend.
All code and data used for this analysis are provided in the Supplementary
Material.
Capitalist Share of Total (National) Income
US Capitalist income share data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Table 1.12. (National Income by Type of Income). Capitalist income is defined
as the sum of net dividends and net interest.
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Figure 11: US Capitalist Income Inequality Estimates
This figure shows estimates of inequality in US capitalist income distribution. Data
comes from the IPUMS database CPS public micro data. Capitalist income is the sum of
dividends (series INCDIVID) and interest (series INCINT). Confidence intervals indicate
the uncertainty in the estimate that arises from the stochastic method used to replace
topcoded values.
Sources and Methods 25
Calculating Hierarchical Power in the US Hierarchy Model
I define an individual’s hierarchical power as the number of subordinates (S)
under their control, plus 1:
P = S + 1 (7)
Because the hierarchy model simulates only the aggregate structure of firms
(employment by hierarchical level), hierarchical power is calculated as an av-
erage per rank. For hierarchical rank h, the average hierarchical power (P¯h) is
defined as the average number of subordinates (S¯h) plus 1:
P¯h = S¯h + 1 (8)
Each individual with rank h is assigned the average power P¯h. The average
number of subordinates S¯h is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all subor-
dinate levels, divided by employment in the level in question:
S¯h =
h 1X
i=1
Ei
Eh
(9)
Figure 12: Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
As an example, consider the hierarchy in Figure 12. The average number of
subordinates below each individual in hierarchical level 3 (red) would be:
S¯3 =
E1 + E2
E3
=
16+ 8
4
= 6 (10)
Therefore, these individuals would all be assigned a hierarchical power of 7.
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B Adjusting the Capitalist Gradient Model
The capitalist gradient model is built on the following functional relation be-
tween hierarchical power (P) and capitalist income fraction (Kfrac):
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) (11)
Recall that hierarchical power is defined as the number of subordinates + 1.
All individuals with no subordinates therefore have hierarchical power P = 0.
Since ln(1) = 0, all these individuals will have exactly zero capitalist income. By
convention, income distribution is usually only tabulated for non-zero incomes.
Thus these individuals are excluded.
In the adjusted capitalist gradient model, I introduce an adjustment to the
capitalist income fraction equation:
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) + ✏ (12)
Here ✏ is a constant very close to zero. Its effect is only felt when P = 1. Instead
of getting Kfrac = 0, we get Kfrac = ✏. What does this do? It effectively endows
individuals who previously had zero capitalist income with a tiny amount of
capitalist income (a few dollars). The effect may seem insignificant, but it has
an important impact on the capitalist income distribution. As shown in Figure
13, the adjusted model better matches the US data.
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Figure 13: The Adjusted Capitalist Gradient Model vs. US Data
This figure shows the results of an adjusted capitalist gradient model. The adjusted
model allows individuals with a hierarchical power of 1 to have a small capitalist income.
This significantly changes the model’s Lorenz curve and Gini index. Panel A shows the
original capitalist gradient model’s Lorenz curve plotted against US data. Panel B shows
the adjusted capitalist gradient model’s Lorenz curve. Panel C compares the Gini indexes
of the original and adjusted models to US data. Panel D shows the top 1% income share.
US data is from the IPUMS database. See Appendix A.
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